The Rand Corporation 2100 M Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037

THE COSTS OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE

June 14, 1983

AGENDA FOR DISCUSSION

1.	Data	issues: improving estimates, extending coverage, filling gaps, etc.	STAT
	a.	trade subsidies e.g., pricing of Soviet CMEA exports and imports, c.i.f. vs. f.o.b. pricing, etc.	
		trade credits military aid deliveries economic aid deliveries proxy forces covert activities other cost categories? economic offsets 1981-1983	STAT
2.	Gene a. b.	prior expectations among conferees? likely awareness of these costs in Soviet bureaucracy and leadership?	STAT
3.	What	(noneconomic) benefits are ascribed to empire by the Soviet leadership and how important are they?	STAT
	a. b. c.	political benefits abroad, at home military benefits how important are these likely to be among leadership's values and priorities?	
4.	Do C	SE impose significant or insignificant "drag" on Soviet economy?	STAT
	а.	If our estimates of trade-off between CSE and defense or consumption growth are correct, is this likely to be considered significant compared with empire's	

putative benefits?

		CSE likely to rise or fall in 80s?
	a.	tending to lower CSE (oil prices, CMEA pricing formula; resource pressures on Soviet economy; economic offsets)
	b.	tending to raise CSE (economic difficulties in Eastern Europe, Cuba, Vietnam, etc.; softening weapons market, pressure to increase subsidization;
	c.	benefit-cost relationships and political "rents") are there economies or diseconomies of scale in imperial expansion? positive or negative externalities?
.	Shou	Id U.S. policy seek to raise CSE and, if so, how? Henry Rowen)

Soviet imperialism?

c. publicizing CSE?
d. other means?

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